Abstract. Embedded security monitoring module is a dedicated hardware that runs parallel with the embedded processor, which is used to monitor the integrity of the data and code to enhance program execution security of embedded system. It uses hardware-supported methods computing a hash value of instructions with the hash algorithm as an official reference value to prevent malicious attacks on the program code. This paper analyzed possible hash algorithm attacks on instructions, and did the prevention research for the most effective attack, the Rainbow table. In this paper we designed a protection mechanism by adding the interference information to each of instructions, making the attacker's burden greatly increase, so as to enhance the security of monitoring model, and to achieve protection of instruction information.
Introduction
With the rapid development of embedded technology and related applications, embedded system pervades in various aspects of our lives, it is often required to deal with sensitive information, making information security an important concern in embedded system design [1] . Embedded system has strict resource constraints on the computing power, area, memory, energy, so its security is more challenging than that of general system. Security attack is by implanting malicious data or code to achieve the ultimate goal of the abnormal execution of the program. Embedded systems are often targeted at specific applications. Procedure code of embedded systems determines the procedure execution behavior, ensuring the safety of code plays a decisive role in ensuring the safe operation of the program. In the hardware assisted monitoring model for embedded systems, the program is divided into instructions, and then get the hash value of instruction as the reference value. In this process, there is a risk that an attacker can steal whole program of embedded systems by cracking the static hash value. To solve this problem, we presents an attack prevention mechanism of instruction by analyzing the characteristics of hash algorithm which can prevent the security threats that may be faced, and ensure the security of embedded system.
Integrity Checker
Embedded system security is often compromised when trusted software is subverted to result in unintended behavior, such as leakage of sensitive data or execution of malicious code. Several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature to counteract these intrusions. There is a wide range of techniques have been proposed to enhance software security in the context of general purpose computing systems, most of them address problems such as verifying the identity of the provider of a program, checking the integrity of program binaries or ensuring isolation between different programs running on a system [2, 3] .
In hardware-assisted monitoring for secure program execution on embedded processors, integrity detection algorithm often used in general is hash function [4] . Hash function is the foundation of digital signature and message authentication for the assurance of data integrity due to its collision-free and one-way properties [5] . Specifically, a hash function provides a short signature of data. It is practically impossible to forge the data with the same signature, and this property of hash function is referred to as collision-free. On the other hand, given data, it is easy to compute hash value. However, given a hash value, it is practically impossible to find original data, and this is referred to as one-way property. It is often assumed that a well-designed hash function is secure, that is, it is free of collisions and has the one-way property, even though recent research results have posed serious challenges to the commonly used hash functions.
Threat on Monitoring Information
The core technology of static monitoring information generating is the static hash algorithm, however, the hash function is not completely safe in fact. Attacks on hash functions can be divided into collision attack and preimage attack. The classic preimage attack is to try to guess the plaintext, hashing each possible guess, and checking if the guess's hash equals the hash being cracked. If the hashes are equal, the guess is the correct plaintext data. The two most common ways of guessing plaintexts are dictionary attacks and brute-force attacks.
Plaintexts should be long enough that searching through all possible character strings to find it will take too long to be worthwhile. There is no way to prevent dictionary attacks or brute force attacks. They can be made less effective, but there isn't a way to prevent them altogether. Rainbow tables are a time-memory trade-off technique [6] . They are like lookup tables, except that they sacrifice hash cracking speed to make the lookup tables smaller. Because they are smaller, the solutions to more hashes can be stored in the same amount of space, making them more effective. Table. The attack is to define a reduction function R to be able to return a plaintext value in a specific size. By alternating the hash function with the reduction function, chains of alternating passwords and hash values are formed. Rainbow tables effectively solve the problem of collisions with ordinary hash chains by replacing the single reduction function R with a sequence of related reduction functions R 1 through R k . In this way, for two chains to collide and merge they must hit the same value on the same iteration [7] . The table content does not depend on the hash value to be inverted. It is created once and then repeatedly used for the lookups unmodified [8] . Increasing the length of the chain decreases the size of the table. It also increases the time required to perform lookups, and this is the time-memory trade-off of the rainbow table. An attacker can precompute a database of hash values of several randomly chosen plaintexts, sort them and compare them against the hash values in the plaintext file.
Instruction Protection Mechanism Prevention of Hash Attacks
In the current security mechanisms hash function is used to check program and data integrity, so program and data information is threatened by security attacks [9] . In order to prevent security attacks, to improve the computational difficulty of the hash function is an effective method for prevention of rainbow table attack due to the generating process of rainbow table. The total generation time of rainbow table will greatly increase, which can increase the difficulty of hacking as well. The disadvantage of this approach is that the slow operation will drag the system running speed, so it is not suitable for the actual situation that embedded processor performance is generally weak. On the other hand, hash function will be used repeatedly when generating rainbow tables. If only hash function changed, precomputed rainbow table will completely unable to use, and attacker must regenerate new rainbow table. Hash algorithm is unchanged and known, so we can generate rainbow table in advance, and an effective means of defense is to change form of hash function. This method is easy to use, less resource consumption, and is suitable for the actual situation of embedded monitoring.
An effective way to change the form of the hash function is to generate a random message for a section of text before encrypting it. Random information makes the attacker cannot use a universal rainbow table to crack all data. Kerckhoffs' principle told us, a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. That is to say, the security of the algorithm is not based on the security of random information. The purpose of adding random information is intended to be equivalent to a new hash function. After adding random information, the attacker needs to generate a new rainbow table corresponding to the new hash function. The attacker needs to pay exponentially increasing resources and energy for this.
Instruction Filling Monitoring Method
Based on the principle of integrity detection, current security mechanism to protect the execution of program code in embedded environment includes the static processing part and the dynamic monitoring part [10, 11] .In order to deal with security threats that hash function will faced in the future, the interference information module is added to improve the security mechanism.
The process of improved security mechanism is divided into two stages as well. First is the preparation stage: in this stage, the program has not yet started to run, but we have got the program's executable file. Next, we will to segment the assembly code, to avoid adding extra instructions to the program code, and using the jump as a symbol to separate basic block [12] . The starting and ending address of the basic block is the target of the jump instruction and the next jump instruction from the target address. The length of the basic block is determined by the actual instruction. According to the previous analysis, we extend the length of the instruction information by adding the interference information to avoid being attacked. The barrel principle shows that the security of the system depends on the weakest part of it. In fact, the length of each basic block is different, and the corresponding security threat is not the same. Some basic blocks are not easy to be attacked with the current computer's computing power because of their longer length. Fig.2 shows the block diagram of the proposed hardware assisted monitoring architecture.
The inputs to the monitor include instruction and address, the corresponding interference information, and the pipeline status from the pipeline control unit. Effectively, the monitor is provided with a cycle-by-cycle trace of the executing instructions and their program addresses. The monitor's outputs include a stall signal and an invalid signal. In this paper, we proposed that filling the instruction of basic block with "random interference information". According to the selected hash algorithm and security requirements, we need to determine a safe character length at first. Combined with the particularity of the embedded application environment, we take the following filling method, as shown in Fig.3 . If the length of the basic block exceeds the safe character length, we use XOR to combine the random interference information with this basic block. For the basic block of which length below the safe character length, we use the interference information to increase the length of the basic block to reach the safe length. Meanwhile, increased random interference information should have enough security redundancy. The purpose of enough security redundancy is to make the interference information of each basic block different, and increase the burden of the computer at the time of attack. It should be noted that, when checking whether the instruction is correct, we also need this interference information. Then using hash function operation for each filled basic block, and get hash value as reference value of static monitoring information.
In the formal stage, monitoring information is loaded into the storage module of the security module, and allows the program to run in the CPU. Security module will get the decoded instruction from CPU, and in the storage module search the current basic block of monitoring information for static reference value. Then security module will use the interference information to fill the instruction as before, and compute the hash of the filled instruction. When finding the hash is not the same as the static monitoring information, the security module will send out the alarm and output the exception message.
Effect and Analysis
As a practical example of applying instruction filling method, a program that is divided into 6817 instructions, the number of data packets and corresponding operation periods are increased by 14.2% after the instruction filling with 320 bit safe character length, and the number of rainbow table that the attacker needs increased to thousands of times, as described in Tab.1. After adding random interference information to the instruction, attacker still can steal instruction information by using rainbow table attack in theory. The interference information corresponding to each of instructions is not the same in the instruction protection mechanism, so the attacker's burden of computer cracking greatly increased, and the security of hardware monitoring module greatly improved. The resource consumption of the instruction protection mechanism is relatively small at the same time.
Summary
In the embedded hardware monitoring module, the program is divided into the instruction, and hash value of the instruction is used as the reference value. Since the characteristics of hash algorithm, the instruction information faces threats from rainbow table attacks. Rainbow table attack is effective because we use the same hash algorithm for each instruction. If two instructions are the same, they must have the same hash value. The new instruction protection mechanism adds a random disturbance information to the instruction, equivalent to the use of different hash function. Even if the interference information is stolen by the attacker, as long as the interference information is random, the former rainbow table attack will fail. The protection mechanism can greatly increase the security of instruction in embedded system, and the corresponding increment of operation cycle is in a reasonable range.
